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THE JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER LECTURE
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD*
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW
The role of the Supreme Court in our governmental structure has
been a topic of discussion since the publication of the Federalist
Papers. Marbury v. Madison' and Dred Scott v. Sandford2 were high
points in the opportunity for comment in the first century of the
Court's history. In more recent years, the cases from Plessy v.
Ferguson3 through Brown v. Board of Education4 and Milliken v.
Bradley,5 with many others, have provided constant reminders of the
crucial function of the Court in our legal and social structure.
Another line of controversial cases lies in the fields of social and
economic legislation. In the first third of this century, the Court
moved strongly in this area, holding state statutes invalid under doc-
trines of what came to be called "substantive due process." Thus,
statutes limiting hours of labor,' and statutes fixing a minimum
wage,' were held beyond legislative power, because they were said to
deny the workman his "freedom of contract." Although there is no
mention of "freedom of contract" in the Constitution, the Court
found it to be a part of the "liberty" which is protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These particular matters have passed into history. I mention them
simply to recall to mind that there has been an ebb and flow of
* Dean of the Harvard Law School, 1946-67; Solicitor General of the United
States, 1967-73; Member, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C.
1 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
2 19 Howard 393 (1857).
3 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
6 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
1 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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constitutional doctrine in the Supreme Court throughout its history."
Sometimes the Court seems to go rather far in one direction. As a new
case is decided, it becomes a foothold for a new decision establishing
an even more novel doctrine. Eventually, though, the Court may
conclude that it will go no further, or even withdraw a bit.
In recent months there have been some complaints that the pres-
ent Court is "pulling back," and that this is an undesirable develop-
ment. The Washington Post recently had a front-page article under
the headline "Citizen Access to U.S. Courts Reduced," 9 in which it
said that "the high court is making clear that it . . . feels the federal
courts are too active." And even more recently, in connection with
the conference held in St. Paul in commemoration of the Seventieth
Anniversary of Dean Pound's Address on "The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,"'" leading officers
of a number of civil liberties organizations circulated a memorandum
contending that "A series of Supreme Court decisions during the
past few years . . . have radically reduced the ability of the lower
federal courts to exercise their responsibilities under the Constitution
to enforce the Bill of Rights.""
Is there truth in the contention that the Court is pulling back?
And if there is, what is its significance?
I
Under the pediment of the Supreme Court Building in
Washington are carved the words "Equal Justice under Law." It is
not known just where this phrase was found. It has overtones of the
words from Bracton which Lord Coke addressed to Charles I: "Non
sub homine sed sub deo et lege." But that contains no reference to
"justice." Diligent search has failed to find a prior use of "Equal
Justice under Law," though President Jefferson used the phrase
"equal and exact Justice" in his inaugural;'" and Justice Matthews
used "equal Justice" in his opinion in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.'3 But the
8 Cf. Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication - A Study of Modified
and Overruled Decisions, 46 HARv. L. REV. 361, 593-95 (1933).
Washington Post, Sunday, April 4, 1976, 1, 8 (Sec. A).
" 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 14 AM. LAWYER 445 (1906), 20 J. AM.
JUD. Soc. 178 (1937). See also Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of 1906, 20
J. AM. JUD. Soc. 176 (1937).
1 "Memorandum to Participants in the 'Pound Revisited' Conference," dated
April 7, 1976, signed by Aryeh Neier, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties
Union, and nine others.
12 1 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 323.
13 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
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phrase itself has not been found in literature, or in earlier opinions
of the Court. We are told by Mr. Justice Burton that it apparently
was suggested by or through the distinguished architect of the Su-
preme Court building, Mr. Cass Gilbert. 4 He proposed it to Chief
Justice Hughes, and he, after consulting with Justice Van Devanter,
a co-member of the Commission, approved the wording which is now
carved so firmly and boldly at the main portal to the building.
Though the origin of "Equal Justice under Law" may be obscure,
it is fair to say that the Court has so far adopted it as its own standard
that it has become a commonly accepted symbol for the Court.'5 On
that basis, I am going to consider the two elements in the phrase, and
to ask whether each has been given appropriate weight over the past
twenty years. This is obviously a difficult and delicate task. This is
an area where no one can know the right answer, and where all differ-
ences, within wide limits, are differences of degree. But, as Holmes
said: "Most distinctions. . . are of that sort, and are none the worse
for it."'" Nor is it possible to demonstrate what is "right" or "wrong"
in this area. The questions are matters of judgment, and all that one
can hope to do is to bring out factors which may appropriately bear
on the resolution of that question of judgment.
In what I say here, I am not being critical of anyone. There is no
doubt that the persons constitutionally authorized to make decisions
are the Justices of the Supreme Court. And there is no doubt that the
members have been ably and conscientiously devoting themselves to
their assigned task. Any comment made is offered only in the hope
that it may be relevant and helpful in the process of understanding
the work of the Court.
With this background, I come to the question: Have adequate and
appropriate weight been given in the decisions of the Court to "Equal
Justice" and to the other element in the phrase - "under Law"?
Perhaps the inquiry can be given color by referring to a question
attributed to Chief Justice Warren. He is said to have asked a lawyer,
with his benignant smile: "I have heard your argument, but is it
fair?" This remark has received a measure of public acclaimY The
question remains, though whether justice alone is enough, whether
there can be real justice except "under Law."' 8 Seeking "justice" as
" See the statement by Mr. Justice Burton in 37 A.B.A.J. 735, 738, n. 17 (1951).
" Cf. Warren, C.J., in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1958) (The Constitution
created a government directed to equal justice under law).
" Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 631 (1906).
,7 WEAVER, WARREN-THE MAN, THE CouRT, THE ERA 9 (1967).
" "But I know of no way we can have equal justice under law except we have some
law." Jackson, J., in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433, 546 (1953).
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the only objective points to a road which leads to anarchy. Unless the
decision is likewise made "under Law" there caib be no certainty of
even-handed justice, no way to rely on decisions of the past.,9 Each
case will be decided by wise men - to whom Judge Learned Hand
referred as "Platonic Guardians""0 - but, without law, there will
eventually be no justice.
On a cursory examination, this may seem to be simply an example
of the age-old tension between stability and change in the law. The
basic historical example is law and equity, where equity was devel-
oped by the English chancellors in an effort to alleviate the rigidity
of the early common law system - in a word, for the purpose of
introducing "justice" into the law. It was Dean Pound who observed
more than fifty years ago: "Law must be stable and yet it cannot
stand still."" And this was quoted approvingly, and developed, by
Cardozo in his GROWTH OF THE LAW a few years later.22 As these
examples show, it is a question of balance. No one contends that the
law should be rigid or unchangeable.
Despite an analogy, the problem we are discussing is fundamen-
tally different. Dean Pound and Chief Judge Cardozo were referring
primarily to the common law, the law which grows and develops
under the guidance of the courts. In that field, there is a constant
tension between the need for growth to meet new conditions on the
one hand, and the claim of precedent, as a means of stability and
certainty on the other. Generally speaking, in this area, there is no
written text to construe. The problem is illustrated by such a case as
"1 "I have said to my brethren many times that I hate justice, which means that I
know that if a man begins to talk about that, for one reason or another, he is shirking
thinking in legal terms." Mr. Justice Holmes, in a letter to John C.H. Wu in 1929,
reprinted in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs: His BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED
PAPERS 201 (1936).
Cf. The following passage from the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter, for October 20,
1946 (p. 276):
"At the core of such an attitude was, of course, the assumption of
belief that there is no such thing as law and that law and opinions are
just ways of clothing themselves in legal jargon. Schlesinger said that
there is a school of legal thought. . . which believes that and believes
it is a question of whether your side or the other side is going to use
the Supreme Court for its purposes. I told him that such an attitude
was of course just as wicked as it was dishonest."
20 HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958): "For myself it would be most irksome to
be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I
assuredly do not."
21 POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923).
CARDOZO, GROWTH OF LAW 2 (1924).
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McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 where the question turned on ad-
justing the common law relating to negligence to new circumstances
and needs.
But the Supreme Court decides very few cases in any area of the
common law. Indeed, for most cases, it has determined that the fed-
eral courts must apply the common law of the states in which they
sit.u The problems with which we are concerned, in contrast, relate
primarily to the construction of written instruments, either the Con-
stitution, or relevant statutory provisions. This does not mean that
there is always a clear and precise text. There are some things in the
Constitution which have to be inferred, as, for example, the law relat-
ing to separation of powers,2 or the law relating to intergovernmental
immunities,2 or some of the law relating to interstate commerce.2
But most constitutional law, and virtually all of the application
of statutory law, finds its foundation in a text. Often the text is by
no means clear as applied to the particular situation. Nevertheless,
the result reached, if it is to be acceptable, must be tied in some
persuasive way to the text. Some texts may be more expandable than
others,2 but, all would agree, I suppose, that the Court's conclusion
cannot be legitimate unless it can be derived in some valid and rea-
soned way from the text.
A further factor in the constitutional field is that the Court is not
subject to any sort of review, for practical purposes, except for what-
ever weight there may be in professional criticism. It is true that the
Dred Scott case was overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment; and
the income tax case of 18949 was overruled by the Sixteenth Amend-
ment. More recent efforts to overturn Court decisions by constitu-
tional amendment have not been successful, as in the case of the
Bricker Amendment, and proposed amendments designed to over-
turn the decision of the Court with respect to reapportionment, and
prayers in school. Thus, there is much foundation for the observation
of Justice Jackson that: "We are not final because we are infallible,
- 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
24 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
' Cf. United States v. Nixon, 408 U.S. 683 (1974).
26 Cf. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
2 Cf. Bikle, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARv. L. REV. 200 (1927).
2 Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observation in his concurring opinion in Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956): "Due process is, perhaps, the least frozen concept
of our law - the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social
Standards of a progressive society."
29 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), on rehearing 158 U.S.
601 (1895).
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but we are infallible only because we are final."30 This remark is often
treated as a quip. There can be no doubt, though, that it is taken very
seriously by members of the Court, who are, of course, conscientious
not only in the exercise of their duties, but in confining their work to
its proper scope. If questions are raised, here as to whether they have
always succeeded in that effort, it is not from any lack of respect for
the work of the Justices, but is derived from an effort to evaluate what
they have done. If it should be said that it is an effort to "second
guess" their work, it can be replied that that is something they must
be doing all the time.
In considering the question of the balance between "Equal Jus-
tice" and "under Law" in the Court's decision, I am going to try to
focus on three aspects of the questions. These are not the only ques-
tions that could be raised, but they will serve to indicate the nature
of the issues. The areas which I am advancing for consideration can
be put under the following headings:
1. The influence of "discretion" on the cases which the Court
decides.
2. The influence of personal views and predilections in construc-
tion of the Constitution.
3. Has the Court fostered developments which allocate essen-
tially legislative functions to the judiciary?
II
The Influence of "Discretion" on the Cases
Which the Court Decides
A. The discretionary nature of appeals.
Until 1891, the Supreme Court had no discretionary jurisdiction.
It had to decide every case which came to it in accordance with the
Acts of Congress providing for appeals or writs of error. The concept
of certiorari was introduced in 1891, when the circuit courts of ap-
peals were established.3 It was then provided that decisions of the
circuit courts of appeals in cases where federal jurisdiction rested
solely on diversity of citizenship should be reviewable by the Su-
preme Court only on writs of certiorari. Thus, discretionary jurisdic-
tion entered the Supreme Court appellate tent in a very small way.
It has now pretty well occupied the premises.
A considerable part of this development was doubtless inevitable.
30 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
11 Act of March 3, 1891, c.517, 26 Stat. 826.
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At the close of the period of mandatory review by the Supreme Court,
with no intermediate appellate courts, in 1891, the Court was years
behind on its docket. Even earlier, its Justices had been forced to
limit or give up circuit duties, which they had continued into the
1870s.32
Discretionary jurisdiction was greatly extended in 1925, by the so-
called Judges' Bill." Nevertheless, Congress still provided that a sub-
stantial part of the Court's jurisdiction should be by appeal.34 This
was the term which had been used from the beginning to designate
the Court's obligatory jurisdiction, that is, the cases which the Court
must hear, if they fall within the terms prescribed by Congress.
Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction in cases involving ambassadors, and
where a state is a party. The Constitution then provides:
In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
Thus, the control of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction lies with
Congress, and the court recognized this long ago.? Congress has exer-
cised this power by providing for review by certiorari of certain deci-
sions of the courts of appeals, and of state courts, and of the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico,36 and of all decisions of the Court of Claims and
of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. But it has also pro-
vided for a review by appeal of some decisions of the courts of ap-
peals, 3M of the state courts, 39 and of the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico;4" and, in addition, it has provided for direct appeal to the Su-
preme Court from all decisions of three-judge district courts,4' and
from any decision of a United States court holding an act of Congress
unconstitutional.
The significant thing to note here is that though Congress has
32 FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, TIE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT 75-77 (1928).
Act of February 13, 1925, c.229, 43 Stat. 936.
3, This soon came to be the term applicable to both appeal and writ of error. See
Act of January 31, 1928, c.14, 45 Stat. 54.
Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869).
2' See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), § 1257(3), and § 1258(3) (1974), respectively.
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1255(1) and § 1256 (1974), respectively.
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1974).
2, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) & (2) (1974).
' 28 U.S.C. § 1258(1) & (2) (1974).
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1974).
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assigned an extensive discretionary jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court, it has also provided specifically, pursuant to a power expressly
granted to it by the Constitution, for appeals as of right in another
substantial group of cases. It may well be that this legislation by
Congress is unwise, or that it is now outmoded. It may well be that
if the Court followed the statutes as enacted by Congress it would
inevitably fall way behind in its docket, as it did before 1891 and
before 1925. One can readily sympathize with the problem confront-
ing the Court. But the fact remains that the Court has in this area,
for all practical purposes, converted review by appeal into a some-
what more complicated species of certiorari. Under its rules, it re-
quires the filing of a "jurisdictional statement" in all appeals, and it
treats the jurisdictional statements in most of the cases brought on
appeal as essentially the equivalent of a petition for certiorari.
4 3
This practice began forty years or more ago. Often the question
of appeal turns on whether there is a constitutional question. The
Court early concluded that there must be a "substantial" constitu-
tional question. One could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court merely by asserting that there was a constitutional question,
or by asserting a constitutional question if that question had already
been clearly and definitely decided." Thus the practice developed
that the Court need not hear the case unless the question raised is
"substantial." But what is "substantial"? It is easy to see how this
question shades off into a discretionary jurisdiction. A case may well
seem to raise a "substantial" question if it is one which a Justice
wants to hear, or thinks that it might be in the public interest for the
Court to hear. The conclusion may be reached not on the substantial-
ity of the legal issued raised, but in terms of the importance of the
case to the public interest. And on such a question, the views and
predilections of the Justice may have, consciously or not, a significant
impact."5
42 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1974). Until 1971, there was a right of appeal by the United
States to the Supreme Court in certain criminal cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 3731 (1974).
Now all such appeals must be taken to the court of appeals.
13 Rules 13(2) and 15 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Rule 15 requires a
statement of "the reasons why the questions presented are so substantial as to require
plenary consideration, with briefs on the merits and oral argument, for their considera-
tion."
" In Rule 15(1)(e), the Court cites Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1922),
which involved a city ordinance requiring vaccination as a condition of attendance at
school. The validity of such a provision had been upheld in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905). One can only say that the Court no longer limits the practice to
questions which have already been directly decided.
Cf. BLACK, My FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 187 (1975): "My father recognized the
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As I have indicated, it is understandable that the Court should
seek to find ways to fend off appeals. Accustomed as the Justices are
to the freedom which they have under the certiorari system, it must
be vexing to have to give consideration to many appeals, even though
a sizable proportion of them are clearly not of the significance and
importance of many cases which are declined when they can only
come to the Court on certiorari. The fact remains, though, that Con-
gress, which clearly has constitutional power in this area, has pre-
scribed that certain classes of cases shall be heard on appeal, without
any allowance of discretion to the Court.
The situation which has developed can only be called irregular,
and has recently led to some discussions which are rather amusing,
if they did not involve the Court's unwillingness to abide by the
statutory law as prescribed by Congress. A number of lower courts,
both federal and state, had come to the conclusion that the practice
was so loose that it was a fair appraisal that dismissal of appeals by
the Supreme Court should be given no more effect than a denial of
certiorari.46 And this view was apparently accepted in considerable
measure by theCourt in its opinion in Edelman v. Jordan," decided
in 1974, where the opinion was written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist. The
claimant there relied on three recent per curiam affirmances by the
Supreme Court of district court decisions in favor of claimants who
were similarly situated," as well as a prior decision49 by the Court
where the issue was clearly raised, though the Court "did not in its
opinion refer to or substantially treat the Eleventh Amendment argu-
ment."5 Similarly, the Court observed in Edelman that the three per
curiam affirmances did not "contain any substantive discussion of
this or any other issues raised by the parties."51
process of selecting cases as the heart of a Justice's job, for he believed that whoever
has the power to decide what cases will appear has the power of the Court. .. ."
11 See, e.g., Dillenberg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1972); National
Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 62 Wis.2d 347, 364, 215 N.W.2d 26, 35 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 940, 946 (1975).
See also, Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues' - A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 12 (1964); Com-
ment, The Significance of Dismissals 'For Want of a Substantial Federal Question:
Original Sin in the Federal Courts, 68 COLuM. L. Rav. 785, 791 (1968).
47 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
11 State Dep't of Health v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972); Sterrett v. Mothers' and
Children's Rights Organization, 409 U.S. 809 (1972); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49
(1970). In the Zarate case, for example, the entry reads: "Judgment affirmed. Mr.
Justice White is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted."
' Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
The quotation comes from the opinion in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 670.
"Id.
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On this basis, the Court reexamined the question, and now
reached the opposite conclusion. It said:
This case, therefore, is the first opportunity the Court has
taken to fully explore and treat the Eleventh Amendment as-
pects of such relief in a written opinion. Shapiro v. Thompson
and these three summary affirmances obviously are of prece-
dential value. . . .Equally obviously, they are not of the same
precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treat-
ing the question on the merits. . . .Having now had an oppor-
tunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue
after briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh
Amendment holding of those cases .... 11
Thus the Court sought to keep its options open. But one may
fairly ask: Is this justice "under Law"? Or is it an unwarranted yield-
ing by the Court to the exigencies of its vastly crowded docket, de-
spite the valid laws made by Congress?
The next item in this little procedural (or is it only procedural?)
drama came just a year later in the Court's opinion in Hicks v.
Miranda." That case involved the constitutionality of a California
obscenity statute. In an earlier case, Miller v. California,4 on appeal
from the Supreme Court of California, which sustained the validity
of the statute, the United States Supreme Court had dismissed the
appeal "for want of a substantial federal question" - with two dis-
sents. But in the Hicks case, the lower court held that it was not
bound by the decision in the Miller case, since that was simply a
dismissal, not very different from a denial of certiorari.15
The Supreme Court did not look with favor on this enterprise of
the three-judge district court. In an opinion by Mr. Justice White, the
Court observed that "we had no discretion to refuse adjudication of
the case on its merits as would have been true had the case been
brought here under our certiorari jurisdiction. We were not obliged
to grant the case plenary consideration and we did not; but we were
required to deal with its merits." The Court did so, in the earlier case,
by dismissing the appeal "because the constitutional challenge to the
California statute was not a substantial one. The three-judge court
was not free to disregard this pronouncement." 56
" Id. at 670-71.
422 U.S. 332 (1975).
418 U.S. 915 (1974).
Miranda v. Hicks, 388 F. Supp. 350, 364 (C.D. Calif. 1974). The court said that
"this court cannot attach plenary precedential value to the summary treatment."
"422 U.S. at 344.
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Thus the rule is now clear. It can be stated somewhat crudely in
these terms: You lower courts must do what you are told. These
decisions are binding on you. But we are free to do what we want,
when we take a second, or third, or fourth look.
This is understandable. It may be a means of handling an impos-
sible docket, which Congress has so far been unwilling to alleviate,
and which indeed the Court, or some members of it, have not been
willing to recognize.5' But is it "Equal Justice under Law"? Non sub
homine sed sub deo et lege. Why should not the Supreme Court be
bound by the law?
The latest episode in this strange saga came less than a year ago
in a case decided in this circuit. This is Hogge v. Johnson," a case
involving the edifying question of the constitutional validity of an
ordinance of Hampton and Newport News forbidding the operation
of massage parlors where the treatment is given by a person to a
person of the opposite sex. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court of
Virginia had held a similar ordinance adopted in Falls Church to be
constitutional. 59 On appeal of that decision to the Supreme Court of
the United States, the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question." While the Hogge case was pending in the Fourth
Circuit the Supreme Court decided Hicks v. Miranda, to which I have
referred above, where it held that the lower courts are bound by the
Supreme Court's summary decisions on appeals. On this basis, the
Fourth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Craven, upheld the validity
of the ordinance from Hampton and Newport News. The interesting
aspect of the matter is that one of the members of the panel of the
Fourth Circuit was, by designation, Mr. Justice Clark, retired Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States. He wrote an opinion
which can fairly be called remarkable. He said:
The Supreme Court's statements in Hicks v. Miranda,
seem to me to fly in the face of the long-established practice
of the Court at least during the eighteen Terms in which I sat.
During that time, appeals from state court decisions received
treatment similar to that accorded petitions for certiorari and
were given about the same precedential weight. . . . I cannot
1, See letters from the Justices in the Report of the Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for
Change 172-188 (1975); Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40
U. CHI. L. REV. 473 (1973).
- 526 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1975).
51 Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168 (1972).
90 409 U.S. 907 (1972).
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believe that the Court in 1972 gave such serious consideration
to the merits of that case as to justify the precedential value
now assigned to it."'
This is a view from inside rarely vouchsafed to members of the bar
or the general public.
Clearly Congress has not provided for a completely discretionary
docket for the Supreme Court. Is it fitting - or desirable - that the
Court should nevertheless make its docket essentially discretionary?
Should decisions of the Supreme Court, in cases which Congress has
said can be taken there of right be ones which a member of the Court
"cannot believe that the Court . . . gave such considerations to the
merits . . . as to justify the precedential value now assigned to it"?
Of course we have known that this has been happening for a long
time. As Justice Clark said, it has become a "long-established prac-
tice of the Court." Is it a proper practice? Does it lead to "Equal
Justice under Law"?
B. Non-final judgments which are "final."
There is another area where the Court has seemed to be rather free
in its reading of Acts of Congress. Ever since the first Judiciary Act,
Congress has limited Supreme Court review of the highest court of a
State to a "final judgment or decree."62 Congress thus has always
recognized that interference with state court decisions was a serious
matter, and has provided from the beginning that this should be
done only when the state procedures are exhausted, that is, when the
judgment of the state court is a "final judgment."
Despite this clear language, the Supreme Court has little diffi-
culty in deciding cases from state courts even though it is far from
clear that the state court's decision is "final." There are two recent
illustrations of this practice. In North Dakota State Board of Phar-
macy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc.,"' the question turned on the
validity of a state statute which provided that the owner of a phar-
macy must be "a registered pharmacist in good standing." The state
supreme court held the statute unconstitutional, relying on an earlier
decision of the Supreme Court," and remanded the case to the state
' 526 F.2d at 836.
' Act of September 24, 1789, c.20, sec. 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85. This is now found in 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1974).
414 U.S. 156 (1973).
Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
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Board of Pharmacy for further consideration, without restraint from
the ownership statute. It is hard to see how this was in any real sense
a final judgment, since the matter was remanded for further
proceedings. Nevertheless, the state Board of Pharmacy brought the
case to the Supreme Court of the United States. That Court held that
it had jurisdiction, overruled its earlier decision, and reversed the
judgment of the state court.
The other case is Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn. 5 Involved
there was a Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to broadcast
the name of a rape victim. In a suit for damages, brought by the
victim's father, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the validity of
the statute, and sent the case back to the lower court in Georgia for
trial. Here again, it is hard to see how the decision was a final judg-
ment, since the case was remanded for trial. Nevertheless, when the
broadcasting company filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of the
United States, the Supreme Court held that the judgment was final,
and that the Court had jurisdiction to review it. Again it reversed the
state court decision.
C. Other examples of the Court's tendency to increase its discretion.
Another area where the Court has taken jurisdiction restrictions
somewhat lightly is that of jurisdictional amount. Congress has pro-
vided that in certain classes of cases the federal court shall have
jurisdiction only when the amount involved is in excess of $10,000.6
In some cases, particularly where civil rights are involved, the failure
to make such a showing has not prevented the Court from reaching a
decision on the merits.17 These limitations may be unwise and unfor-
tunate, but it is not clear that that is a sufficient reason for not giving
them effect."8
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
6' 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1974).
'O Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 239 (1968).
Another case of this genre is the recent decision in Thermtron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 96 S. Ct. 584 (1976). Section 1447(d) of Title 28 of the United States
Code provides that "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise," with an exception which is not
relevant. Despite this clear provision by Congress, the Court held that a remand order
was reviewable by a writ of mandamus. The Court reached this result by holding that
section 1447(d), despite its breadth, was applicable only to remands under section
1447(c), which applies only where the case was "removed improvidently and without
jurisdiction."
See also Commissioner v. Shapiro, 96 S. Ct. 1062 (1976), where the Court found a
way to get around the clear provision of section 7421(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,
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D. Commentary
All of these matters may be thought to be rather technical, and
they are. Why do I bring them up in a lecture like this?
My concern is that the broad approach taken by the Court in
these cases operates to increase the area within which the Supreme
Court's authority is in essence discretionary - the area in which the
Court can decide a case when it wants to do so, or leave it alone at
its discretion. What is wrong with that? The Court cannot decide all
of the appellate cases in the country. It has too many cases to consider
now. These things are true, and they are arguments to be addressed
to Congress. I think that Congress should take steps to narrow the
Court's jurisdiction, and to expand the appellate capacity of the
country."9 But this should, I think, be done by Congress, and not by
the Court doing what seems to be little more than ignoring the pre-
scriptions which Congress has made under its clear constitutional
power.
Why am I concerned about discretionary jurisdiction? It is one
thing for a court to sit and decide the cases which are brought before
it by litigants, taking the cases as they come - big cases, little cases,
important cases, and cases of no general concern. The decisions in
these cases constitute the stream of law, coming as they do in direct
consequence of the cases brought into the judicial system by litigants.
Where, however, the Court can decide such cases as it wants,
there is inevitably a selection, and a distortion of the stream of law.
Certain kinds of cases are decided. Other types of cases can almost
never get a hearing before the Supreme Court. And there is almost
inevitably a tendency to "reach out," and bring in certain types of
cases for decision, because the Court is interested in such cases, or
regards them as important for the country, or simply because the
Court finds a certain satisfaction in moving the country along by
making new law.70 Increasing discretion in selecting cases for review
which says that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person. . . ." This statutory provi-
sion has a long history of judicial escape. See Enochs v. Williams Parking Co., 370 U.S.
1, 7 (1962). It has been suggested that Congress should amend the statute by adding
the words "and we mean it" at the end.
11 See Griswold, Rationing Justice - The Supreme Court's Caseload and What
the Court Does Not Do, 60 CoNEL. L. REv. 335 (1975).
71 As Justice Douglas once said in a television broadcast, "I'd rather create a
precedent than find one." Transcript of Television Interview, CBS Reports, September
6, 1972. See also, Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949). This is doubt-
less exhilarating, but may give considerable opening for the personal views of the
person involved.
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inevitably tends, I think to encourage "reaching out," and this may
have the effect of substantial distortion in the Court's handling of
cases, and in its choosing of cases for decision.
7'
On this subject Professor Lusky has written that the Court has
"acted on the 'prudential' - one might say, more bluntly, opportun-
istic - basis of deciding questions if and when it thought the public
welfare (as discerned by the Justices themselves) would be fur-
thered. 17 2 And he added that "the 'prudential' approach in the selec-
tion and mode of adjudication of cases . . . is by no means a trivial
assumption of power. It is a very large assumption of power indeed;
. . . it raises a serious question as to whether the Court has shaken
itself free from all external restraint and begun to function as a con-
tinuing constitutional convention.
' 7
A Justice of the Supreme Court has been quoted as saying: "When
I see something I do not like, I want to hit it." This is an understanda-
ble reaction. But is "do not like" a proper basis for the choice of cases
for decision, particularly when the determination whether a case
should be heard is made summarily without full opportunity for con-
sideration? Is this a situation where "Equal Justice" gets too much
consideration, while "under Law" is pushed too far in the
background?
HI
Personal Views and Predilections - Rewriting
the Constitution
I turn now to what is doubtless an even more controversial sub-
ject. To what extent has the Court imposed its own views on the
country, creating new constitutional law based more on the personal
views and outlook of the Justices than on anything that can be found
in the Constitution? There are several areas in which the Supreme
Court over the past twenty years has "made" constitutional law,
reaching conclusions for which it is extraordinarily difficult to find
any adequate base in the Constitution itself. These matters have
7, A petty illustration of this, some years ago, was the taking for review and
summary reversal of many cases under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, and other
negligence cases. See MENDELSOHN, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE
COURT 22-30 (1961); From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter 330-333 (1975) (entry for
November 22, 1947).
72 LUSKY, By WHAT RGmT? 5 (1975). The word "prudential" comes from BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, c.4 (1962).
3 Id.
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been thoughtfully and thoroughly examined in a recent book by Pro-
fessor Louis Lusky of the Columbia Law School, entitled By WHAT
RIGHT. In this book he asks "the question whether the United States
Supreme Court is still the law's servant or has become its master."
7
Professor Lusky examines the cases in greater detail than is possible
in this lecture and his book should be read by anyone who is inter-
ested in the problems which are raised by the Supreme Court's ap-
proach and by its decisions.
75
A. Incorporation
A striking example of this sort of constitution making is to be
found in the process by which nearly all of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights found in the first eight amendments to the Constitution
have been declared to be literally applicable to the states. Of course,
these provisions are by their terms, and by their history, directed
against Congress alone. The First Amendment begins "Congress shall
make no law. . . ." And there are numerous decisions in our consti-
tutional history holding that other provisions of the first eight amend-
ments are not applicable to the states.76 Yet, over the past generation,
nearly every provision of the Bill of Rights - though not all of them
- has been imposed on the states.7 7 How has this been brought
about? The instrument has, of course, been the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which makes no reference to free speech, or jury trials, or self-
incrimination. It does, however, provide that no state may deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property "without due process of law"; and
' LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? 1 (1975).
7 Reference should also be made to the stimulating article by Professor Monaghan
on Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1975), where he advances the
thesis that many constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court are really statements
of "constitutional common law," and that they are subject to change by Congress.
Examples may readily be found in the decisions under the commerce power, and in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), where the Court recognized that legislatures
could make changes in the Court's rules - if Congress or the state legislatures could
do a better job.
" See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), holding that the privilege
against self-incrimination, provided by the Fifth Amendment, is not binding on the
states, and Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875), and Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900), both holding that the jury trial provisions of the Bill of Rights are not applica-
ble to the states.
"T An excellent review of the course of development in these areas may be found
in GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975). See, espe-
cially, pp. 506-547, on "incorporation," and pp. 548-656, on "substantive due process."
Another fine summary, from a different point of view, is ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1976), especially pp. 493-599.
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it further provides that the states shall not deny to anyone the equal
protection of the law. Obviously, the Fourteenth Amendment has
some meaning, though its terms are quite general; and it is binding
on the states. Although the process has earlier roots, it was perhaps
first clearly recognized in the opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko
v. Connecticut.78 He there summarized a number of situations, in-
cluding freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of one accused
of crime to the benefit of counsel, where -
immunities that are valid as against the federal government by
force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have
been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and
thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment become valid
against the states.
79
Since that time, the process has moved relentlessly ahead. In
1940, the Court referred to the "absorption of the First" Amendment
by the Fourteenth."0 The great leap forward began with Justice
Black's dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California.' Justice Black
strongly objected to the "absorption theory" because he said that it
provided no appropriate standard. In his view, it amounted to an
assertion -
that this Court is endowed by the Constitution with boundless
power under "natural law" periodically to expand and contract
constitutional standards to conform to the Court's conception
of what at a particular time constitutes "civilized decency"
and "fundamental liberty and justice" . . . I think . . . the
"natural law" theory of the Constitution upon which it relies
degrade[s] the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights
and simultaneously appropriate[s] for this Court a broad
power which we are not authorized by the Constitution to exer-
cise."2
Justice Black was not willing to accept this responsibility on a retail
basis. He felt that he was being a "stzict constructionist," and that
he was fending off a dangerous "natural law." Yet, he was entirely
willing to reach the same goals - and more - on- a wholesale basis,
without realizing or conceding that he was making a very similar, but
79 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
79 Id. at 324-25 (footnote omitted).
" Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 319 U.S. 586, 593 (1940).
" 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947).
A2 Id. at 69, 70.
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more sweeping, natural law construction of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. On this he said:
In my judgment [the history of the Fourteenth Amendment]
conclusively demonstrates that the language of the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought
by those responsible for its submission to the people, and by
those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to guar-
antee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the
privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights. 3
The historical foundation for this view seems unpersuasive. 4
Although Justice Black spoke in dissent in the Adamson case, and
although his thought that he was free from a "natural law" approach
seems unwarranted, it is a tribute to the force of his character and
will that before long he had persuaded a majority of the Court to
make most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights binding on the
states. Thus in Jacobellis v. Ohio,85 Justice Black, speaking for the
Court, said that "The First Amendment is made obligatory on the
states by the Fourteenth." Similarly, in Terry v. Ohio,8" Chief Justice
Warren referred to "the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth," and in Stanley v. Georgia,7 Justice Mar-
shall referred to the "First Amendment as made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment."
There is a tendency in court decisions to build upon each other,
and for subsequent decisions to go further than may have been con-
templated when an earlier case was decided. As I have said elsewhere:
There is a sort of decisional leap-frogging [which] takes over
as a principle expands: the first decision is distilled from the
language of the Constitution. But the next expansion begins
from the reasoning of the last decision, and so on down the line
until we reach a point where the words of the Constitution are
so far in the background that they are virtually ignored. In the
end we may be left with a rationale that comes to little more
than "Well, it really is a good idea. We want a free society
'3 Id. at 74, 75.
' See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1941). See also Justice Black's respon-
ses in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165-171 (1968).
378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
a' 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
-7 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
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where all of these things can be done and we want to keep the
Government off the backs of the people.""8
There are governmental procedures for bringing such results about,
but it is hard to think that such adumbrations of the Constitution are
an appropriate exercise of judicial power. 8
There are many problems with these results. We now have a very
different Constitution, as far as the powers of the states are con-
cerned, from that which was adopted in 1789 and 1791, and from any
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in two or three genera-
tions after it was adopted. The limitations on the power of the states
may well be desirable. Do they, though, represent an application of
the proper balance between the two parts of "equal Justice under
Law"? Should such changes have been brought about in a democratic
country by judges holding life tenure, and deliberately isolated from
all political influence? Are the expansions of the Constitution, and
thus of the Court's power of oversight over many aspects of American
life, legitimate functions of the judiciary? Do they allocate to the
Court powers which, in a proper division of constitutional function
would belong to the people, through their representatives? Has the
Court paid too much attention to "Equal Justice" and too little to
"under Law"?"
B. Privacy and "substantial due process."
Another area in which the Court has gone well beyond anything
n Griswold, The Judicial Process, 28 RECORD OF THE AssociATON OF THE BAR 14,
24-25, 31 FED. B. J. 309, 317 (1973).
"1 See also Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAUF.
L. REV. 929, 950 (1965). Compare, Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 351 (1974).
"1 One of the difficulties with the process which the Court has followed is that it
may weaken the guarantees provided by the Constitution with respect to the federal
government. For example, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court held
that the provisions for jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment are binding on
the states through the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Very shortly there-
after the Court held that a jury need not contain twelve members. Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970). And in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), it held that a jury
verdict might be rendered in a criminal case on less than a unanimous vote. Both of
these conclusions seem almost surely contrary to the view which would have been held
by the persons who adopted the Bill of Rights, if they had ever thought the question
one which should be considered. Thus, it may well be asked whether safeguards which
the Constitution provides against the federal government have not been weakened
because these provisions were extended, contrary to contemporaneous understanding,
to the states.
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which may be found in the Constitution is that of privacy. There is
nothing in the Constitution about privacy; the word is not used either
in the Constitution or in any of its amendments. Nevertheless, a great
constitutional structure has been erected in this area based upon the
First Amendment. It will be recalled that this provides that Congress
shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press, and
provides further that the people may peaceably assemble and peti-
tion the government for a redress of grievances. One thinks of Peter
Zenger and Faneuil Hall.
In NAACP v. Alabama,"' the Court referred to "freedom of asso-
ciation and privacy in one's associations." This was apparently the
first modern appearance of privacy in a constitutional context. It
will be recalled that the case held that the NAACP was not required
to disclose its membership lists in Alabama. This seems to be reason-
ably derived from concepts of due process and of freedom of speech
and of association.
The big step was taken in Griswold v. Connecticut.3 That case
involved a Connecticut statute which forbade the use of contracep-
tives, and made it an offense to assist in the violation of that statute.
The petitioners in that case had given contraceptive information and
advice to married persons. They were found guilty of an offense under
the Connecticut statute, and that was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut.
When that case came to the Supreme Court of the United States,
the decision was reversed on what were said to be First Amendment
grounds. It is apparent, though, that the Court was conscious of the
fact that it was reaching very far. What it said was that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.""
Reference was made to the Third Amendment, and to cases arising
under the Fourth Amendment. From this it was concluded that
"These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for
recognition here is a legitimate one."95
3 57 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
92 Proponents of a constitutional right of privacy have traced roots back as far as
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), where the Court referred to the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments as protections "of the sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life."
:3 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484.
" Id. at 485. Cf. Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 693 (1972).
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It is hard to tell just how far a penumbra reaches in the constitu-
tional area, and it may be thought that the detection of "emanations"
is a highly personal matter. Some might think that the real meaning
of these words in this context is "that the Constitution does not cover
the subject but ought to because it does so much else that is desira-
ble."96 The least that can be said of this is that it is going rather far
from the constitutional text.97
Another, though less striking, expansion of the concept of privacy
is found in Stanley v. Georgia,"0 where officers, holding a search war-
rant in connection with alleged bookmaking activities, found three
reels of pornographic film in a desk drawer in an upstairs bedroom.
The case might well have been decided on standard Fourth Amend-
ment grounds (now that the Fourth Amendment has been incorpo-
rated in the Fourteenth), since the search went far beyond anything
covered by the search warrant. But the Court went on to say that:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas. . .This right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, .. is
fundamental to our free society. . . . [A]lso fundamental is
the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from
unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.99
And then the Court concluded that "The States retain broad power
to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home."'' 0 It is
an appealing decision. But where can it be found in the Constitu-
tion? Did the Court give adequate consideration to its duty not just
to decide the case in a heart-warming manner, but to decide it "under
Law"?'01
The culmination of this development to date is found in the still
rather startling decision in the abortion cases, Roe v. Wade,"2 and
11 Griswold, The Judicial Process, 28 RECORD OF THE AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR 14,
24, 31 FED. B. J. 309, 317 (1973).
"1 See Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965). Cf. Karst, Invidious
Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the 'Natural-Law-Due-Process For-
mula', 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969).
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 564.
90o 394 U.S. at 568.
"o Cf. Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decisions: The Elusive Quest for the
Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1975); Hastie, Judicial Role and
Judicial Image, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 947 (1973).
1-2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Doe v. Bolton.103 The Court held there that antiabortion statutes of
Texas and Georgia were unconstitutional. The Court recognized that
"The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy."
But the Court continued, citing several cases, including the Griswold
and Stanley cases mentioned above, saying that "the Court has rec-
ognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.""' On
this basis, it quickly reached the conclusion that:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restric-
tions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.-'
Again we find the clear dichotomy between "Equal Justice" and
"under Law." I need not here go into all the details of the decision,
with its elaborate discussion of what it calls the three stages of preg-
nancy, with greatest power being reserved to the woman during the
first three months of pregnancy. (The woman involved in the case was
held to have standing to raise these questions, even though her preg-
nancy had long since terminated by the time of the decision, and
there was nothing whatever to show that she had been within the first
three months of pregnancy at any time the suit was pending.) Even
then the Court did "not agree" that the woman's right is "abso-
lute". 0 Though the decision is based on the woman's right of privacy,
she can act only with the approval of her physician. During the first
three months, "the attending physician, in consultation with his pa-
tient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that in
his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be termi-
nated." 0 '
Verbally, that is surely a great deal to be found in a Constitution
that was created by "sovereign states," and does not mention either
abortion or privacy. But substantively, it may be even more difficult
to fathom. Justice Stewart concurred in the result, pointing out that
in 1963 the Court "purported to sound the death knell for the doctrine
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
410 U.S. at 152.
15 Id. at 153.
10 Id.
101 Id. at 163.
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of substantive due process."'' 8 He quoted the opinion of Mr. Justice
Black, who had written: "We have returned to the original constitu-
tional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and eco-
nomic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies who are elected
to pass laws."'0 ° But, as Justice Stewart said, the Griswold case came
"Barely two years later," and it can only be rationally understood "as
one in a long line of pre-Skrupa cases decided under the doctrine of
substantive due process, and I now accept it as such.""10
There has been a good deal of thoughtful commentary on the
abortion decision, most of it adverse. Professor John Hart Ely has
written that it is a "a very bad decision. . . .It is bad because it is
bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law
and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.""' Professor
Gerald Gunther has written: "The abortion ruling, whatever one's
view of the result, appears an insupportable constitutional interpre-
tation.""'2 Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., has written: "In my view,
no decision of the Warren Court was as problematic, when it comes
to discerning a constitutionally rooted ground for the choice made.""' 3
And Alexander Bickel wrote that, on abortion, "The Supreme Court
prescribed a virtually uniform statute of its own." He continued:
• . .if the Court's model statute is generally intelligent, what
is the justification for its imposition? . . .One is left to ask
why. The Court never said. It refused the discipline to which
its function is properly subject. It simply asserted the result it
reached. . .Should not the question. . .have been left to the
political process, which in state after state can achieve not one
but many accommodations, adjusting them from time to time
as attitudes change?"'
lO Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
'"Id. at 730.
,,0 410 U.S. at 167, 168.
"' Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
947 (1973) - emphasis in the original.
"I2 Gunther, "Supreme Court in Eclipse?" 3 Stanford Mag. 40 (Fall/Winter, 1975).
HI Black, Book Review of Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, in N.Y. Times Book Review, February 29, 1976.
M' BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 27, 28 (1975). See also LuSKY, By WHAT
RIGHT? 15-20, 100 (1975).
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IV
Judicial Action Which is Essentially
Legislative in Character
There is a final aspect of some of the Court's decisions to which I
would like to make reference, and this is applicable, too, to the abor-
tion decisions.
The Constitution divides the Government into three branches.
One of these is the legislative branch, and to it is assigned the respon-
sibility to make the law. We all know that this line is not precise, and
that there are various sorts of delegated legislation, and that both the
executive branch and the judiciary have appropriate powers. But the
function of the Federal judiciary is limited by the terms of the Consti-
tution to the decision of "Cases" or "Controversies," and over the
years there has grown up a large body of law, accepted until recently
by the Supreme Court, which limited the function of the courts to the
decision of specific cases between parties, and generally involving
relatively narrow issues. Such decisions would serve as precedents,
and thus would have an impact on the development of the law. But
they were very clearly distinguishable from the generally applicable
legislative enactments passed by Congress.
In recent years, the Court has more and more been willing to
resolve "great issues," affecting large numbers of people, rather than
confining itself to the important but narrower task of deciding cases
between defined parties. Reference may be made, for example, to the
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,"7 where the Court not only
decided the case before it, but laid down an elaborate series of rules
which the police must follow in interrogating a person who has been
taken into custody. One may agree that these are wise rules, but the
question remains whether under our constitutional scheme they
should have been made by a court or by a legislature. It is hardly an
answer to say that legislatures are slow to move in this area. The
Court could have considered Miranda's case without developing for-
mulated and elaborate rules for all cases in the future. Indeed, the
fact that the Court almost contemporaneously decided that the
I's 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Cf. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 54-55 (1976): "Is there any general judgment for the result of the political
process when dealing with abortion but not with hours of work? To read liberty of
abortion into the Fourteenth Amendment but not liberty of contract?" (Emphasis in
original).
" 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
117 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Miranda rules should not be applied retroactively"8 shows that the
Court understood that it was acting in an essentially legislative fash-
ion.
Some aspects of this development have gone very far in the lower
Federal courts, where decisions have been reached which involve the
courts in substance in taking over large functions of the executive
branch of the government. Thus, in Wyatt v. Stickney,"I a federal
district judge in Alabama has entered an elaborate decree providing
in detail for the staffing and management of a mental hospital, speci-
fying the number of persons on each floor on each shift, and covering
many pages of details in the operation of the facility. This really has
to be seen to be believed. One may have great sympathy for the
provocation which led to this decision. One may recognize the utter
failure of the executive branch, and of the legislative branch which
did not appropriate adequate funds. But there is room to question
whether the actions taken were appropriate for a judge. It is clearly
true that there were parties before the court who had legitimate com-
plaints under the statutes of the United States. Could this possibly
have been handled by a decree providing for the release of these
wronged persons, with a provision for a stay while the state was given
time to make its own proper arrangements? The situation is surely a
difficult one; and one may have great sympathy with and admiration
for the judge, while finding it difficult to resist the conclusion that
what he undertook was beyond the proper function of the judiciary.
Judge Carl McGowan has observed that the prestige of the federal
courts "can only suffer" if they "are made to carry too active a role
in what is surely in large part simply day-to-day administration." He
points out, though, that a measure of the difficulty comes from the
tendency of the legislative branch "to finesse hard choice of policy,"
making broad delegations of authority to department heads or newly
created commissions. In such a case, judicial review may be based
upon an informal request or rulemaking, and he points out that such
a record -
is indistinguishable in its content from the proceedings before
a legislative committee hearing on a proposed bill, consisting
as it does of letters, telegrams, and written statements from
proponents and opponents, including occasional oral testi-
"' Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
"' 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-386, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-408 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
modified, sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See Develop-
ments: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1333-1344 (1974).
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mony not subjected to adversary cross-examination. It is on
that kind of record that a Congressman decides which way to
vote on a bill, . . . No matter how the standard of review is
articulated, there is great latitude for the judge to vote his
policy views in the same manner as does the legislator. No
matter how sensible the necessity for restraint by a life-time
judge not accountable to the electorate, the opportunities, and
the consequent temptations, are great to come down on the
side of the judge's personal conceptions of policy. Even the
humblest judge - and the most alert to the dangers of result-
oriented adjudication - may slip, sometimes subconsciously,
if his predilections are sufficiently engaged, and thereby risk
nullification of the principle that democracies are to be run in
accordance with the majority will. 2 '
Similar problems result from changes in the Rules of the Supreme
Court which were adopted by the Court in 1966. These provided a
greatly expanded scope for "class actions," that is, law suits in which
one or more persons sue on behalf of all persons similarly situated.''
Some of the classes which have been brought to court are truly enor-
mous - all persons who sold real estate in Los Angeles County over
a period of several years,12 all persons who bought or sold odd lots
on the New York stock exchange, 2 3 and so on. It is true that the law
is still developing in this area, and the decisions of the Supreme Court
have so far had a restraining influence on those who regard "class
actions" as a panacea for all of society's ills.124 It should not be over-
looked, though, that cases of this sort turn the court proceeding into
something not very different from a legislative hearing, where spokes-
men for large and indefinite groups endeavor to persuade legislators
to take action which would be beneficial to them.
The Supreme Court has indicated that it is aware of the problem
of the proper scope of judicial function which lurks in this area. In
Laird v. Tatum, 25 by a narrow margin, it reversed a judgment under
which the United States District Court in the District of Columbia
"2 McGowan, "Congress and the Courts," an address delivered at the University
of Chicago Law School, April 17, 1975, pp. 8, 9, and 10.
"I Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 383 U.S. 1039, 1047 (1966).
'2 Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974).
"I Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
"I See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
12 408 U.S. 1 (1973).
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would have been put into direct charge of operations of the army with
respect to citizen surveillance, making it necessary for a military
commander to get the permission of the court before undertaking
surveillance operations, even in times of great emergency. The
surveillances which had occurred in that case were wrong. But they
had been stopped. The Court placed its decision on lack of standing
of the plaintiffs, but it may have been influenced by the Govern-
ment's contention that matters of this sort should not be put into the
hands of the courts in the first instance, but should remain in the
primary control of the military. The courts will still be open if there
should be further abuse.
In a sense we now complete the circle, for the Court's recent deci-
sion in Rizzo v. Goode,'2' about which complaint has been made, is
another example of the Court's recognition that the judiciary cannot
properly undertake the general operation of the government, both
state and federal. In the Rizzo case, it appeared that certain members
of the Philadelphia police department had abused a number of citi-
zens. None of the wrong-doing policemen was a party to the case,
though some of them appeared as witnesses. Mayor Rizzo was a party
to the case, but he had not been mayor when the wrongful events
occurred. The lower courts approved a decree requiring the mayor
and other city officials (none of whom was shown to have done any-
thing wrong) to set up elaborate machinery for police supervision and
complaints. This was reversed in the Supreme Court, on the ground
that the decree went beyond the proper function of the court. It went
too far towards putting the court into the operation of the police
department.
It should be noted that this decision does not say that people who
were wronged cannot recover from the persons who did the wrong.
What it says is that the courts should confine themselves to dealing
with the actual wrongs, and that elaborate decrees designed to pro-
tect other persons against the police generally, and binding on city
officials who are not shown to have committed any wrong, are not
appropriate. In my view, the Supreme Court should be given appro-
priate credit for having recognized that there are limits to the judicial
function. This was a case, it seems to me, where the Court did render
"Equal Justice under Law."
Let me make it plain that I am not urging a passive role for the
Court. As Professor Gerald Gunther has recently written:
In 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976).
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Proper constitutional interpretation contemplates forward
movement concentrating on those very important issues to
which the Constitution speaks. It contemplates judicial self-
denial as to those problems ultimately assigned to the political
process.
1 7
And he concludes that it is "a characteristic of a healthy constitu-
tional scheme that we do not look to the Court for the solution of all
our problems.""'
I may conclude this portion of my paper by recalling a quotation
from Charles Evans Hughes, which is an often overlooked portion of
his observation that "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitu-
tion is what the judges say it is. . . ." He went on to say, however
- and this is the relevant portion here: "Let us keep the courts for
the questions they were intended to consider."'' 9
V
Conclusion
There has always been an ebb and flow in the doctrine and deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, and one can say with confidence that
there always will be. Its task of rendering "Equal Justice" but "under
Law" is never an easy one. It is not really a question of "activism"
or of "strict construction." Both approaches are always necessary if
the proper balance is maintained. There are times when one may
think that the Court is rather carried away by the concept of "Equal
Justice." There are other times when it could be felt that the Court
was too much restrained by the necessity that it reach its decisions
"under Law." Some times these aspects appear in isolated cases. At
other times they seem to run in periods. What is important is to
recognize the inevitability of the process, the care and skill with
which it is handled, and the desirability that there be independent
commentary from outside the Court on the decisions of the Court,
and their trends, as they are announced.
The line is not a clear one. There will be variations according to
the outlook and abilities of each Justice. Over the years, though, we
may be confident that the Court will continue to fulfill what I have
regarded as its symbol - "Equal Justice under Law."
"I Gunther, "Supreme Court in Eclipse?" 3 Stanford Mag. 40, 41 (Fall/Winter,
1975).
' Id. at 42.
I" Speech by Governor Hughes before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce, on May
3, 1907, quoted by Judge Carl McGowan in his lecture at the University of Chicago
Law School on April 17, 1975, entitled "Congress and the Courts," p. 8.
